The Biden administration claims that United States-India relations are “at the center of its approach” to the Indo-Pacific region. Yet the relationship has been badly adrift, with the U.S. having no ambassador in India and being involved in public spats with New Delhi over Ukraine and Russia. 

Now, news that the U.S. will provide substantial support for Pakistan’s fleet of F-16 aircraft threatens directly to undermine it. The administration risks doing real damage to the U.S.-India partnership.

One of the most basic requirements for productive Indo-U.S. relations is the presence of each country’s ambassador in the other’s capital. Yet, nearly two years into the Biden administration, the U.S. still has no ambassador in New Delhi. A former Los Angeles mayor, Eric Garcetti, has been nominated for the job, but he has failed to secure Senate confirmation, and no resolution is in sight. 

The lack of an ambassador makes it harder for India and the United States to pursue joint opportunities and to resolve shared problems. And it suggests to the Indians, who place much stock in matters of rank and standing, a lack of genuine U.S. commitment to the relationship.

Although India and the U.S. share a core strategic interest in balancing Chinese power, they disagree about many things, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine and India’s broader relationship with Russia. 

India has, for many decades, stubbornly charted an independent course in foreign affairs — though it has sometimes been persuaded to cooperate with the U.S. even on contentious issues, such as the sanctions regime against Iran. 

Far from securing Indian cooperation on such matters, the Biden administration has mishandled recent disagreements with India. When India refused to denounce Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, the president publicly chastised it and sent envoys to New Delhi to pressure Indian leaders to change course. 

These efforts achieved nothing except to raise tensions, and the U.S. ultimately had to accept India’s position on Ukraine. To be sure, the administration had reason to wish that India would disavow the Russian invasion. And India has recently issued thinly veiled criticism of Russia, with Prime Minister Modi publicly telling Vladimir Putin “today’s era is not one for war.” 

Yet the administration should have known that India’s long-standing dependence on Russia made Ukraine a sensitive issue, and that publicly hectoring India would be counterproductive. Quiet discussions, recognition of the genuine difficulties of India’s strategic position, and realistic expectations would have served better.

The most egregious problem in the Biden administration’s management of U.S.-India relations is also the newest — additional U.S. military support for Pakistan. 

The administration has announced a $450 million agreement to sustain Pakistan’s fleet of F-16 fighter aircraft. This will increase the threat to India along its western borders and distract its attention from the task of balancing China. 

The deal also suggests that the United States is a fickle partner, claiming to want close Indo-U.S. cooperation while underwriting India’s sworn enemy. Why would the U.S. give Pakistan such problematic military support?

A state department press release claims that the United States aid will help Pakistan to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. But relying on Pakistan to fight terrorism is akin to trusting the fox to guard the henhouse. 

The strategic use of terrorism is an essential component of Pakistani grand strategy, and Pakistan has supported Islamist militants for decades, in direct opposition to U.S. interests. 

Indeed, Pakistan’s unwavering support for the Taliban over the past two decades was a central reason for the United States’s failure in Afghanistan. 

The U.S. should avoid relying on Pakistan for counterterrorism support, and cultivate other regional states for such cooperation, even if doing so is difficult or costly. Whatever these states’ shortcomings may be, Pakistan is almost certain to be a worse counterterrorism partner.

Another possible motive for the F-16 deal is a U.S. hope that military aid to Pakistan will enhance strategic stability on the subcontinent, balancing weaker Pakistan against stronger India and ensuring that neither gains an upper hand. 

The U.S. should not seek equity in the Indo-Pakistani military balance, though. India is a close U.S. partner that can help to offset rising Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific. Pakistan is a longtime supporter of terrorism that worked against the United States in Afghanistan and is a close friend of China. 

A stronger India, better able to focus on China and the Indo-Pacific, is in the U.S. interest, even if it disadvantages Pakistan. Efforts to ensure a level playing field through military aid to Pakistan directly undermine this goal.

Finally, the administration may hope that the F-16 agreement will keep Pakistan reliant on U.S. defense supplies and prevent it from becoming overly dependent on Chinese weapons. 

Yet Pakistan is already hugely dependent on China. For decades, Pakistan has considered China its “all-weather ally.” Projects like the $46 billion China-Pakistan economic corridor dwarf the U.S. F-16 agreement. 

The F-16 deal is sufficiently large to threaten and distract India, and thus harm United States interests. It is not nearly big enough to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on China.

Given these problems in the United States-India relationship, what should the Biden administration do? 

First, the administration should install a U.S. ambassador in India. If Mr. Garcetti is not viable, then he must be replaced with another candidate. There is no dearth of qualified individuals in public life who would be eager to take the job. Failure to fill this position hobbles United States-India cooperation and signals a lack of U.S. seriousness about the partnership.

Second, the administration must handle disagreements between the United States and India with greater diplomatic finesse. It should recognize that India will diverge from the U.S. on certain core issues like Russia. 

Such differences, even if unfortunate, do not obviate shared U.S.-India interests in balancing China, and maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. Frustrations, while often understandable, must be addressed privately, without public scolding.

Finally, the administration must avoid the temptation to rely on Pakistan for counterterrorism support, especially when doing so undermines its strategic partnership with India. 

Recent decades have shown conclusively that Pakistan is an unreliable partner, a fact that the Trump administration’s South Asia strategy finally recognized. 

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan means the United States needs Pakistan less than at any time in the last 20 years. The U.S. should take advantage of this fact and cultivate other counterterrorism partners in the region, whatever challenges this may pose.

The Biden administration is not yet halfway through its tenure. It still has an opportunity to repair the damage that has occurred to the U.S.-India relationship. But time is running out. If the administration does not act soon, the harm to U.S.-India relations, and to the two countries’ shared ability to shape the Indo-Pacific region, could be lasting.